We analyse an economy where banks are uncertain about …rms' investment opportunities and, as a result, credit tightness -due to banks' pessimistic beliefs -can result in excessive risk-taking. In the competitive credit market, banks announce credit contracts and …rms apply to them, as in a directed search model. The Central Bank can a¤ect banks'liquidity costs by changing its lending rate. We show that high-risk Self-Con…rming Equilibria coexist with a low-risk Rational Expectations Equilibrium, in this competitive search economy. Misperceptions never disappear in a Self-Con…rming Equilibrium. Lowering the CB policy rate reduces the set of parameters for which a high-risk SCE exists; nevertheless, within this set of economies, this interest rate policy is ine¤ective. However, a credit-easing policy can be an e¤ective experiment, breaking the high-risk (low-credit) Self-Con…rming Equilibrium. Since the latter does not arise from a coordination failure, the implications of the model di¤er from models of Self-Ful…lling credit freezes. In particular, we emphasise the social value of experimentation, often neglected in the recent literature that vindicates robust decision making as a form of good governance for central banks. (JEL: D53, D83, D84, D92, E44, E61, G01, G20, J64) Preliminary and incomplete draft. The views expressed in this paper do not necessarily re ‡ect the ones
Introduction
This paper explores the macroeconomic consequences of individual uncertainty about others'agents opportunities and corresponding payo¤s. In particular, we study a competitive economy where, in equilibrium, individual …nancial intermediaries (banks) -possibly, due to a collective 'bad experience"-can have pessimistic beliefs about …rms' capacity or incentive to make low-risk investments. With such beliefs, banks charge a risk-premium to cover their expected losses. And, facing high interest loans, …rms' optimal investment is a risky project. As a result, the behaviour of …rms self-con…rms banks' pessimistic beliefs and these beliefs persist in a high-risk equilibrium. It is in this context that there can be a rationale for credit-easing policies: breaking the high-risk (low-credit) Self-Con…rming Equilibrium.
The model components
In our model, the competitive credit market consists of a continuum of …rms and banks. The latter post credit contracts and the former apply for these contracts, in order to …nance their investment projects. The interest rate on the loan de…nes the credit contract and, consequently, the type of project and size of the investment that maximises …rm's pro…ts. In the simplest version of our model, we assume that, at any point in time, …rms can only invest in one project, which can be either a risk-free project, which involves a per-unit cost, or a risky project with zero per-unit cost. Firms'expected pro…ts depend on the probability that their loan application is accepted and, if so, on the expected net return of their project. When a risky project fails …rms only repay the principal of the loan (the pledgeable part) and, therefore, the lender-bank also bears part of the risk, which is compensated by the loan's interest risk-premium. Firms' have rational expectations in making their choice conditional on the existing menu of debt contracts. Firms in our model can be non-banking …nancial intermediaries. In particular, intermediaries of Asset Backed Securities (ABS) that by incurring a per-unit monitoring cost can guarantee a 'safe' ABS package, while the latter becomes risky if they do not incur the cost. In contrast with models of Self-ful…lling credit freezes (e.g. Bebchuk and Goldstein 2011) a …rm's project returns does not depend on other …rms' …nancial conditions. As it will see, in our model credit freezes can arise even if there is no coordination failure.
Banks are …nancial intermediaries that borrow money from the Central Bank in order to provide loans to individual …rms. There is free entry in this industry and banks cannot default on their Central Bank obligations, including CB lending-rate payments (i.e. default is too costly for banks). Banks know their costs with certainty but they are uncertain about their revenues, since they have to anticipate …rm's reaction to their credit o¤ers not knowing in which project …rms will invest. We weaken the rational expectations hypothesis, with respect to banks, by assuming that their beliefs only need to be 'locally-rational' in equilibrium, meaning that they satisfy two conditions: …rst, as in directed search-models, marginal variations of loans' interest rates are expected to be compensated by marginal variations on the number of applications; second, banks expect to loose if they o¤er non-equilibrium debt contracts and these beliefs are locally correct (i.e. for small, non-marginal, deviations); however, they may not be correct for large deviations that would result on a di¤erent choice of project. For example, banks may wrongly believe that o¤ering a lower interest rate will not cover their expected losses since they miss-perceive the investments …rms will undertake when borrowing at low interest rates. This equilibrium is a Self-Con…rming Equilibrium and, only when banks'correctly perceive …rms' reactions to all their o¤ers, it is a Rational Expectations Equilibrium; i.e. only when the second rationality requirement is global. In our model, the Rational Expectations Equilibrium is unique.
In our model the Central Bank does not have superior information than private banks; nor has a better commitment technology than them, as it happens in the work of Karadi and Gertler (2011) on credit easing -it does. However, the CB maximise social welfare, not just banks'pro…ts, and has access to society's resources (tax revenues). As we now will argue -in contrast with the work of Chari et al. (2010) on credit easing, where CB policy is ine¤ective -these two classical components of public policy provide a rationale for a credit-easing policy. Before characterising this policy it is useful to consider more conventional Central Bank interventions.
The Central Bank policy interventions
The Central Bank a¤ects the banks' cost of liquidity by changing its lending rate. A conventional policy of lowering the CB policy rate reduces the set of economies for which an economy has a high-risk Self-Con…rming Equilibrium. For economies within this set, the CB lower interest rate policy is ine¤ective. For economies outside this set, the same policy can have a radical e¤ect by destroying the wrong perceptions of the banks: only the Rational Expectations low-interest rate equilibrium exists after the policy has been introduced.
In our economies neither for …rms nor for banks there is an issue of a shortage of capital or liquidity: …rms apply for loans without constraints at the interest rates speci…ed by banks and, similarly, banks can borrow unlimited amounts from the Central Bank at its lending rate. Therefore, there is no role for an unconventional policy of capital injections from the CB to the banking system. If the latter is trapped in a high-risk Self-Con…rming Equilibrium such a policy will be completely ine¤ective: it would only rebalance the respective balance sheets and we have abstracted from capital-requirements regulation issues.
Should the Central Bank pursue an unconventional policy of directly lending to …rms? And, if so, how? Given that, as we have said, there are no capital shortages, the only reason could be if by doing so the CB could break a high-risk Self-Con…rming equilibrium shifting the economy to the more e¢ cient no-risk Rational Expectations Equilibrium. However, in our economies, the Central Bank does not have any informational advantage, wouldn't the CB have the same mis-perceptions than private banks? In our model the answer is yes; in fact, it can even be more pessimistic than the private sector. However, as we have already emphasized the CB and private banks have di¤erent -social vs. private -objectives. The di¤erence translates into a di¤erent assessment of the value of experimentation in the dynamic formulation of the model.
The dynamic model is basically a repeated version of the static model just described. In particular, in the simple version with two types of projects, one safe and one risky, the state of the economy has two components: the per-unit cost of the safe project and the probability of success of the risky project. Missperceptions by banks does not mean that they have degenerate beliefs assessing, for example, zero probability to the safe technology being available, but simply that their subjective beliefs are distorted with respect to the objective distribution generating the state of the economy. In our model once self-con…rming mis-perceptions have been falsi…ed, the economy remains in the unique rational expectations equilibrium and, therefore, the policy intervention only needs to be implemented temporarily. This was already true in the not-very e¤ective interest rate policy and it justi…es the more e¤ective credit-easing policy. To understand this policy we …rst address the issue of the value of experimentation and then how the policy can be implemented in our economies.
Free entry in the banking industry implies that if banks (mistakenly) assign a low probability to …rms investing is safe projects may have no incentive to 'experiment' with low interest rates, even if posting a credit line with very low interest rate will eventually dissipate the misperception. The reason being that the discovery would become immediately available to all …rms and the zeropro…t condition would be restored the following period. In contrast, a welfare maximising central bank may have a positive value for such experimentationeven if it attaches the same, or even lower, probability to the safe technologysince it values the move to a more e¢ cient equilibrium against the cost of the temporary implementation of the credit-easing policy. In fact, this di¤erent can be very large if the CB is relatively patient, o¤setting the pessimistic beliefs. Furthermore, the CB can be in the position to engage in a large scale experiment, which may reveal the true distribution of projects in one period. Notice that even if banks could coordinate to perform a large scale experiment, they will only anticipate the new zero-pro…t condition at the rational expectations equilibrium.
However, as we have also emphasized, the Central Bank does not have the technology to intermediate with …rms and, therefore, cannot directly lend to them at a low interest rate. Banks must act as the 'transmission' for CB policies. The credit-easing policy in our economies is a policy of subsidizing banks' risky loans, creating a wedge between the relatively high interest rate charged by banks and the relatively low interest rate faced by …rms. This wedge modi…es the behaviour of the banks as if they had revised their beliefs as give higher probability to …rms investing in safe projects. Such policy, it is only costly while the test is being carried out and banks end up providing loans for risky projects. It is …nanced with tax revenues 1 . For a relatively patient Central Bank it is worth to carry the experiment, even if she has the same 1 For simplicity, in this draft, we assume the large-scale test only takes one period. misspeci…ed pessimistic beliefs than private banks, provided that she is not a 'robust decision-maker,'for whom the test must be successful in the worst case scenario. However, the fact that the CB has to implement its policy through the banking system creates an interesting trade-o¤: the more aggressive is the policy (i.e. the higher the subsidy) the less costly -but, at the same time, the less potentially bene…cial -it is for an individual bank to deviate from the SelfCon…rming low-credit equilibrium, although there always exists an aggressive enough credit-easing policy that, by temporarily absorbing the risk, destroys the Self-Con…rming low-credit equilibrium.
In sum, our theory provides a rationale for credit-easing policies or -one should better say, 'experiments' -since in our economies 'experimentation' is a public service. In particular, it can help to explain why these unconventional policies may result in either ine¤ectiveness or immediate success. A similar dichotomy is present in Bebchuk and Goldstein's (2011) model of credit freezes -to our knowledge, the closest paper to ours -and, therefore, it is useful to have a …rst contrast of both models.
The contribution of the paper
In sum, our theory provides a rationale for credit-easing policies or -one should better say, 'experiments' -since in our economies 'experimentation' is a public service. In particular, it can help to explain why these unconventional policies may result in either ine¤ectiveness or immediate success. It is a (complementary) alternative theory to the more standard theory of Self-ful…lling credit freezes. In our view, an example of this type of success has been the Term Asset Backed Securities Lending Facility (TALF) of the FED in the collapse of the ABS market in the 2008-2009 crisis. We discuss the comparison with Self-ful…lling credit freezes and the TALF experience in the next section.
Our work is also novel in bringing the concept of Self-Con…rming Equilibrium to a competitive environment. This concept, was pioneered in game theory by Fudenberg and Levine (1993) and in macroeconomics by Sargent (1999) . In both contexts, the beliefs of a non-negligible agent are misspeci…ed out-ofequilibrium. This has two consequences. First, the agent's deviation from the equilibrium path can disrupt the equilibrium and detect the miss-perception; something which is not possible in a frictionless competitive environment. Second, the individual and social value of experimentation is basically the same. We develop a model of competitive economies with search frictions where SelfCon…rming Equilibria may exists and have predictable power (not everything goes); in particular, public policy experimentation can be a public service.
The roadmap
In Section 2 we compare our model with a model of Self-ful…lling credit freezes and brie ‡y describe the TALF experiment. In Section 3 we describe, more formally, the components of the model. In section 4 we de…ne and characterise Self-con…rming equilibria. In Section 5 a more detailed analysis of …rms'investment choices allows to sharpen the characterisation of Self-con…rming equilibria. Section 6 discusses Central Bank policy interventions and, …nally, Section 7 concludes (tbc). As we have seen, in our model there are no positive complementarities among …rms and banks and the underlying rational expectations equilibrium is unique. Our (two-variables) state of the economy plays a similar role that the B&G state of the economy. Similarly, the analogy can be extended to consider that our Self-con…rming high-risk (low credit) equilibrium correspond -even if they are qualitatively di¤erent -to their rational expectations Self-ful…lling credit freezes. Keeping this analogy, both models have a common property: policies that are e¤ective in 'destroying' the low-credit equilibrium only need to be implemented temporarily: until they produce the desired 'cleansing e¤ect'. They also have a fundamental di¤erence: in their model the ine¢ cient Self-ful…lling credit-freeze equilibrium is a manifestation of a coordination failure, while in our model the ine¢ cient Self-Con…rming low-credit equilibrium is a manifestation of persistent misperceptions. As a result there is a 'structural policy'fundamental di¤erence: Self-ful…lling credit-freezes can be avoided by concentrating the banking system in the B&G model, while banking concentration does not resolve the Self-con…rming equilibrium problem (as long as expected pro…ts are zero), while more competition in the banking system may weaken the persistent misperceptions problem, but worsen the coordination failure 2 . Regarding the three mentioned policy interventions of the Central Bank a brief comparison of their e¤ects is as follows:
Lowering the lending rate: it has a similar e¤ect in both models: for certain states of the economy the policy destroys the low credit equilibrium, while for other (not at the margin) states the policy is ine¤ective.
Capital injections into the banking system: in B&G Central Bank can be e¤ective since they raise the amount of lending and, therefore, they also reduce the set of economies for which a Self-ful…lling credit freeze equilibrium exists. In contrast, in our model as we have already mentioned such a policy is ine¤ective.
Credit-easing : while both models vindicate this policy as the most e¤ective in reducing the probability of a low-credit equilibrium, there is an important policy di¤erence while, in terms of e¢ ciency, Credit-easing can be dominated by a policy of capital injections into the banking system in B&G, as we have seen this can never happen in our economies. Furthermore, one expects that it should be 'less costly' to resolve a persistent misperceptions problem than a coordination failure with credit-easing this is an empirical (or properly simulated) question, for which modelling di¤erences should be resolved. Some of this di¤erences are: in B&G the Self-ful…lling credit freeze is associated with low risk in …nancial markets (in fact, only riskless government bonds are traded), while in our low-credit Self-con…rming equilibrium is characterised by high risk investments; in B&G an economy falls into a Self-ful…lling credit freeze equilibrium as a result of an adverse shock to banks'capital, in ours into a Self-con…rming low-credit equilibrium because of an increase in risk in the …nancial sector(possibly more consistent with the evidence); in B&G the policy is implemented by directly lending to …rms and the CB is prevented from substituting the private bank system by assuming that it cannot discriminate between bad and good …rms as private banks do while, in our model as we have seen, the CB cannot substitute the private banks and, therefore, implements the policy through them (which seems closer to the evidence; see below the TALF example). Finally, in our model Credit-easing is an explicit policy experiment in which cost and bene…ts are assessed and the di¤erent public-private valuations compared as part of the policy design, while in their model the policy design problem is not addressed (a common feature of Self-ful…lling equilibrium models).
In sum, Self-Con…rming and Self-Ful…lling ine¢ cient low-credit equilibria are complementary theories for the same phenomena. With important di¤erences -the main being the underlying mechanism -both vindicate the unconventional policy of credit-easing, but it is beyond the scope of this paper to provide a more de…nite comparison among the two. Nevertheless, the following recollection of the main credit-easing policy experiment can help to see strengths and weakness of both theories.
The collapse of the ABS market and the TALF policy
In the 2008-2009 crisis of the Asset Backed Securities (ABS) market in US. In the second half of 2007 the ASB market has experienced a sudden contraction after a constant increase in volumes since early 2000. 3 The crash was mostly driven by lower-than-expected returns in the housing markets which depressed the value of subprime home equities. The dramatic increase in perceived risk and the lack of con…dence in rating agencies did even not spare an abrupt freeze of the AAA-rated ABS segment whose interest-rate rose at exceptionally high levels re ‡ecting unusually high risk premiums 4 . As a consequence private liquidity collapsed rapidly, and investors directed available resources to quality assets like treasury bills which almost doubled their daily volumes of trade from 40 to 80 USD billions during 2008-2009. Within this context the FED stepped in with the lunch of the Term Asset Backed Securities Lending Facility (TALF) which supplied about 71 billions of non-recourse loans 5 at lower interest rates, to any U.S. company provided of highly rated (AAA and AAA-) collateral. This intervention was made primarily to sustain the credit market in a period of high perceived counterpart risk. More precisely, the FED acted as a borrower of last resort taking the risk of experimenting contractual conditions which were perceived as too risky by the private sector.
Nevertheless, despite malign prophecies welcoming the birth of the programs, on the 30th of September 2010, the FED announced that more than 60 percent of the TALF loans have been repaid in full, with interest, ahead of their legal maturity dates. In other words, the more favorable conditions o¤ered by the FED, instead of triggering an adverse selection process, have been the prelude of a remarkable business performance and expansion of consumption credit.
Should we conclude then that the market was mispricing highly rated ABS? Not necessarily in the sense that probably at such high interest rates failures to repay the loans could have been much more likely. However, a real risk psychosis was preventing the private sector from experimenting and so revealing the existence of pro…t opportunities in the high quality segment of the ABS market. In the absence of the FED intervention such bias could have not been corrected, self-sustaining a suboptimal outcome with major consequences for the already tatty American economy.
3 General framework
Environment: Actions and Timing
A continuum of …rms of mass one look for credit to implement investment opportunities. Atomistic banks borrows money in the interbank market, or equivalently at a rate determined by the central bank (CB), and lend to …rms. Both are risk neutral. Firms liability is limited to principal component whereas banks cannot default on the interbank (or CB) lending. Therefore when a project fails, which occurs with an exogenous probability, a bank looses interest repayments whereas it is enforced to repay the interests on its own loan. The return on a project can be secured adopting a possibly more costly type of investment. A …rm adopts the type of investmet in its own interest according to its payo¤ structure which depends on the state of the world. Nevertheless the type of project adopted is not observable, hence banks cannot screen …rms for project quality. The timing in the market is the following:
1. Nature selects the state of the world ! drawing from a set of possible states : each state of the word characterizes a di¤erent payo¤ structure of …rms;
2. a bank can borrow at a rate R CB , controlled by the central bank, in the interbank market;
3. a bank pays a cost c to post a credit contract by which it commits to lend any amount at a …x chosen rate R;
4. a …rm chooses to which posted R to apply for credit;
5. once a macht is formed a …rm chooses the investment policy depending on the interest rate of the contract R and which state has realised ;
6. if the project is successful a …rm pays back interest and principal to the bank, and only principal otherwise;
7. banks pay back their loan irrespective of the success of the project …-nanced.
Banks bear two kind of risks: one is associated with the probability that a vacancy is not …lled, one other originating from the partial enforceability of the posted contracts. An entrepeneur (…rm) instead does not incur any cost if she does not match or if her project fail. Nevertheless, the exposure to risk of banks depends on …rms'choices. In particular, to optimally solve thier problem banks need to anticipate the probability that a posted contract …nds a match and …rms'reaction once matched, that is they need to identify in which state of the word they act. Let us now describe the matching technology and then the payo¤s structure of …rms and banks.
Directed search
The matching framework presented here closely follows the competitive setting introduced by Moen (1997) along a simpli…ed variant described by Shi (2006) . The probability that a match is formed is described by a matching function which is a map < 2 + ! < + from a couple (u; v) -being respectively the measure of illiquid …rms and the measure of vacant credit lines -to x (u; v) being a ‡ow of new …rm-bank matches. The matching function x (u; v) encapsulates a search friction assumed in the competitive credit market. Following standard assumptions , let x be concave and homogeneous of degree one in (u; v) with continuous derivatives. Let p = x (u; v) =u = x (1; ) = p ( ) denote the transition rate from illiquid to liquid for an illiquid …rm, and q = x (u; v) =v = q ( ) the arrival rate of …rms for an open credit line, where is the credit market tightness u=v:
For the sake of simplicity and without loss of generality, we will assume that the matching function has a Cobb-Douglas form
1 and q ( ) = A . This assumption, which is standard in the literature, ensures a constant elasticity to the fraction of vacancies and illiquid …rms.
The search is directed, meaning that at a certain interest rate R there is a subset of illiquid …rms and banks with open credit lines looking for a match at that speci…c R. The number of matches in the submarket R is x (u (R) ; v (R)), where u (R) is the measure of …rms and v (R) the measure of vacant credit lines searching for a counterpart in a credit contract at an interest rate R. The arrival rates of trading partners for …rms and banks in this market are thus p ( (R)) and q ( (R)), respectively, where (R) = u (R) =v (R) is the speci…c tightness associated to the submarket R. Both …rms and banks are free to move between submarkets. Once the match is formed any amount of credit is provided at a rate R. We will say that a submarket is active if there is at least a vacancy posted.
Firms and Banks
Firms choose to which posted contract R 2 H to send its application for funds. Once matched at the targeted R a …rm implement its investment policy f (R; !), namely, a vector of optimal choices in response to a couple (R; !). The objective of a …rm is to maximize ex-ante pro…t
where p (R) is the probability of having an application accepted at a rate R and (f (R; !)) is the expected pro…t from the investment which depend on f (R; !). Banks are …rst movers in the search: they choose whether to enter in the market and eventually post a credit line in a submarket. A credit line is a contract by which banks commit to lend any amount of liquidity to successful applicants at a …x rate R. The ex-ante value of a credit line for a bank is given by
where p (R) is the probability of having an application accepted at a rate R and Y (R; f (R; !))is the expected return on the credit which depend on R and the investment policy of the …rm. Therefore
where is the system of subjective beliefs held by banks on the realization of the state of the word, and c > 0 an exogenous cost associated with the opening of a credit line. In paricular, let de…ne the E operator as follows
where (!) is the banks'subjective probability density function on the random variable! representing 6 the state of the word that Nature selected. Notice that for a bank to solve (2) it has to anticipate the reaction of …rms f (R; !) to the posted R. In equilibrium free entry requires E [V (R; !) c] = 0.
Determination of the tightness
The tightness is a ratio representing the number of …rms looking for a credit line per-unit of vacant open lines. This means that the tightness is independent of the absolute number of vacancies open in a certain market. The matching function is just a one-to-one map between p and q through a ratio . In other words, suppose an equilibrium is associated with a particular probability to obtain credit p, then the matching function gives a = p 1 ( p) and so a q = q p 1 ( p) that is a probability of …lling a vacant line in that submarket. The latter argument is independent on how many vacancies are open in that particular submarket. With a single vacancy open (resp. a measure " of vacancies open), (resp. " ) will be the expected number of …rms searching in that submarket.
What then determines the tightness? The tightness of the market is determined by the rational behavior of the …rms which act after banks publicly announce their contracts. In particular, consider the case where two di¤erent o¤ers R 0 and R 00 are publicly announced. In case J(R 0 ) > J(R 00 ) then …rms will be more willing to send applications to get the R 00 contract rather than the R 0 . As a consequence of a larger number of applications in the submarket R 0 , the probability of matching p (R 0 ) must decrease lowering J(R 0 ). Symmetrically, as a consequence of a smaller number of applications in the submarket R 0 , the probability of matching p (R 00 ) must increase enhancing J(R 00 ). Therefore rationality from the side of …rms implies that, for a given set of posted contracts H = fR 1 ; R 2 ; R 3 ; :::g; the tightness is determined by
where J (R) = J is constant for each R 2 H. In particular, J is the ex-ante utility that …rms expect from participating to the market. Therefore there exists a unique tightness associated to each interest rate R which is conditional to a given level of ex-ante utility guaranteed by the participation of …rms to the market.
Equilibria

Competitive SCE and REE
In this section we provide and discuss a de…nition self-ful…lling equilibrium (SCE) that goes beyond the speci…c payo¤ structure that we will analyse later. Then we will relate SCE to rational expectation equilibria (REE).
De…nition 1 For a given ! 2 ; a self-con…rming equilibrium (SCE) is a set H of interest rates such that, for each R 2 H : (i) …rms maximize expected pro…ts
where J = p ( (R ; J )) (f (R ; !));
(ii) banks maximize expected pro…ts
where J (R) = J is constant for each R 2 <;
(iii) banks correctly anticipates liquidity demand, and so the corresponding type of investment, at any local deviation from an equilibrium contract, that is
for any R 2 = (R ) where = (R ) < is a neighborhood of R .
The …rst requirement implies optimality from the side of the …rms so that (17) de…nes the tightness of the submarkets. Notice that (R; J ) depends on the ex-ante utility granted to …rms at equilibrium conditions, and does not depend on individual choices.
The second condition requires that a bank posts a R that globally maximizes its expected value of a credit line. The relevant expectation is the one conditional to the bank subjective beliefs summarized by .
The third condition restricts banks'beliefs about …rms'actions to be correct in a neighborhood of an equilibrium R . This is a stronger beliefs'restriction of the one usually assumed in the directed search literature to get rid of tremblinghand imperfect equilibria, which involves only …rst-order deviations.
Importantly notice that the de…nition of a self-con…rming equilibrium does not require banks to have correct beliefs about out-of-equilibrium behavior that is far away from the equilibrium considered. This leaves open the possibility that at a self-con…rming equilibrium banks are not actually maximizing in the whole domain of their actions. In fact banks' unbiased beliefs about …rms' payo¤s are only required limited to the neighborhood of the contract that is implemented, and whose e¤ects are therefore observed. Dominant contracts out of a neighborhood of the equilibrium could be wrongly believed by banks to be strictly dominated. Since such contracts will be never posted, then in equilibrium there do not exist counterfactual observations that could confute wrong beliefs.
A REE is a stronger notion than a SCE requiring that no agent holds wrong out-of-equilibrium beliefs. In the present model this equals to impose that banks' unbiased beliefs about …rms' payo¤s. In such a case the equilibrium contract is the one which objectively yields the highest reward with respect to every possible feasible contract.
De…nition 2 A rational expectation equilibrium (REE) is a self-con…rming equilibrium H ? for which:
iii-bis) banks correctly anticipates liquidity demand, and so the corresponding type of investment, at any feaseble R, that is,
A REE obtains from a tightening of condition (iii) in the de…nition of a SCE. This implies that every R ? 2 H ? is such that banks can exactly forecast their payo¤s out of the equilibrium, as they can correctly anticipate …rms'responses. Therefore condition ii) of the de…nition of a SCE becomes
subject to J = p R; J (R; !), in the case of a REE. That is, posting in the submarket R ? is a globally dominant strategy both from an objective and a subjective point of view.
Characterization of the Equilibria
The characterization of a self-con…rming equilibrium of the model it is given by the following.
Proposition 1 Consider two credit lines posted respectively at R 1 and R 2 : From the point of view of a single atomistic bank
with
for any pro…le of contracts o¤ ered by other banks.
Proof. Postponed to the appendix.
Corollary For a given !, a set of contracts H is a SCE if for a given system of subjective beliefs , any R 2 H is such that
for any R 2 <, and
for any R 2 = (R ). A SCE is a REE if and only if (8) and (9), both hold for any R 2 <.
Notice one important feature of the condition above. With = 0 when all the surplus is extracted by banks (9) becomes Y (R ; f (R ; !)) Y (R; f (R; !)), that is at the equilibrium only the interim payo¤ of banks is maximized as …rms will always earn zero. With = 1 instead when the whole surplus is extracted by …rms (9) becomes (R ; !) (R; !), that is only the interim payo¤ of …rms is maximized as banks will always earn nothing. Of course, (9) is satis…ed locally by any interior SCE. In other words, (9) is a condition that implies the local holding of Hosios (1990) condition. Proposition 2 An interior (i.e. when no participation constraints are binding) SCE is characterized by a single contract H = fR g satisfying
for a given parameterization of the functions (f (R; !)) and Y (R; f (R; !)).
The proposition above states that a self-con…rming equilibrium is such that all the matches occur at a unique R . Interior SCEs are locally optimal in the sense of the Hosios (1990) condition. In particular, at a SCE we have that
that is, the fraction of the surplus (properly evaluated) going to banks -the term on the right-hand side -re ‡ects the elasticity of the matching function with respect to the fraction of illiquid …rms in the market. This is exactly the condition for which banks internalize the social cost of opening a new vacancy.
A model of the credit market
In this section we explicitly model the payo¤ structure of …rma and bank that can generate a SCE. Once in a match a …rms chooses the size I and the type & of investment. The expected pro…t of a …rm is
where (&; R; !) is the expected per-unit gross return on the investment size I which is implemented paying a quadratic cost of I 2 =2. A participation constraint imposes 0. Firms can choose between two kinds of projects & 2 fs; rg, respectively a safe and a risky one, which di¤er for the likelihood of success and per-unit adoption cost. Both types have the same gross per-unit return: in case of success is 1 + y, whereas 1 in case of failure. Safe projects do not fail, but their adoption requires a …x per unit cost of k which sums up to the repayment of the bank's loan. Risky project do not have any …x per-unit additional cost, but they are successful only with a probability 2 (0; 1). Hence, a risky project gives a net per-unit expected return of (r; R; !) = (y R) ; whereas a safe project gives (s; R; !) = y k R:
Let therefore complete our structure de…ning a state of the world as the couple of coe¢ cients ! ( ; k), with (0; 1) < + , shaping the payo¤s of …rms. In particular, the associated FOC for the demand of investment determines the investment policy being a mapping f : < + ! < + giving for each R 2 < + a couple f (R; !) = [ (R; !) ; I (R)] such that I (R) = (R; !) = arg max &2fs;rg
as an optimal reply to an o¤er R. The choice of …rms a¤ect banks' expected pro…t Y (R; f (R; !)) I (R) ( (R; !) ; R; R CB ) .
which depends on the size I of the loan and the net per-unit return on the loan. The latter is determined by: i) , the optimal technology choice of …rms in response to R, ii) R CB , the cost of liquidity determined by the central bank, and, of course, iii) on the posted return R. The type of technology determines the degree of pleadgeability of the investment, and so the expected repayment rate of the loan. In case of a risky type of project only a fraction of …rms will be able to repay back I(1 + R), the whole loan, whereas (1 ) will just repay the only pleadgeable part, the principal. Therefore the expected per-unit return on the loan is given by (r; R; R CB ) = R R CB , and (s; R; R CB ) = R R CB were notice that a bank cannot in any case default on the central bank loan, so that its repayment does not depend on . Market participation of both a …rm and a bank require R 2 (y; R CB = ).
Banks and …rms act in a world in which ! is not random. Nevertheless depending on the set of contract is posted, …rms' reaction will reveal either or k. In particular, for a given R, the …rm will adopt a safe technology if it will make higher pro…ts out of it. For a given !, this is the case when the return of the safe technology is su¢ ciently high, so that (r; R; !) (s; R; !), or equivalently, the o¤ered contract is su¢ ciently low, that is
where for banks to make o¤ers it has to be R 0. In fact the cost of liquidity does not a¤ect the choice of projects, but constraint the o¤er of credit lines. We will refer to R as the adoption frontier. As a consequence banks' uncertainty about one of this coe¢ cient can survive. This feature makes SCE possible outcomes.
The following proposition describes the set of REE. s , that is, ceteris paribus, risky projects imply higher interest rates. Nevertheless, the pro…t of a …rm and of a bank can be higher when a risky project is implemented depending on parameters. Notice that at the risky equilibrium banks'participation constraint R The proposition below states the possibility of a SCE Proposition 4 Given ! and R CB there is a su¢ ciently high E [k] such that for <^ a unique SCE that is not REE exists characterized by R r = min y;R r withR r > R. Otherwise only REE exist.
Proof (sketch). By construction it is (R r ; !)
(R) for any R 2 = (R r ) where = (R r ) is a neighboorod of R r . Since <^ then there exists at least a R 0 y k=(1 ) such that (R r ; !) < (R 0 ; !). Still this does not prevent (R r ; !) E [ (R 0 ; !)] since for any R 2 = (R r ) with R r > 0, f (R; !) does not reveal the realization k. In particular, (R 0 ; !) is weakly decreasing in k from which the proposition.
On the other hand, there could not exist a safe SCE that is not REE. Suppose such an equilibrium exists, then it would arise as a corner solution posted at the frontier R because interior safe SCE are always REE. Nevertheless, by de…nition of a SCE, agents would have correct beliefs for marginal deviations from the equilibrium that in this case would provide information about the actual . Therefore at a SCE posted along the frontier R agents would know the actual . Hence banks can correctly forecast f(R; !) at any R, and so they cannot sustain a safe SCE that is not a REE. A contradiction arises. Figure 1 illustrates a baseline con…guration of the economy. Let us …rstly focus on panel A. The feasible range of equilibrium interest rates compatible with the adoption of a safe (risky) technology is the region below (above) the dotted curve representing the adoption frontier of …rms. For any value R r and R s are denoted by respectively the upper and lower solid/dashed lines. In particular, the solid line denotes the unique REE. For <^ a risky SCE coexists with a safe REE (the threshold^ is denoted by a vertical dotted line).
Panel B plots the corresponding levels of aggregate investment for the REE and SCE equilibria, measured in terms of cost-per-vacancy c.
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Panel C and D illustrate the individual maximization problem of a single bank for a speci…c value = 0:7 when all the others post equilibrium contracts. The REE is the safe equilibrium whereas the SCE is the risky one. This is evident from the inspection of panel C. The dotted line denotes the actual payo¤ that a bank would obtain conditional on all other banks posting at the risky equilibrium. The risky SCE equilibrium contract R r corresponds to a local maximum of the dotted line where V (R r ) c takes value zero due to free entry. Posting R r is a locally-optimal action since marginal deviations from that contract would produce ex-ante negative pro…ts. Nevertheless, the risky equilibrium is not a REE because lowering the interest rate up to the point where …rms will adopt safe projects would yield a strictly positive ex-ante pro…ts. The solid line in panel C denotes the actual payo¤ that a bank would obtain conditional on all other banks posting at the safe equilibrium. The safe SCE equilibrium contract R s corresponds to the absolute maximum of the solid line where V (R s ) c takes value zero as a consequence of free entry. Posting R s is a globally-optimal action since any deviation from such contract would produce ex-ante negative pro…ts. 8 Nevertheless, the risky SCE equilibrium, and not the safe REE, can be sustained for su¢ einctly pessimistic beliefs on the value of k. For the sake of clarity, let me provide an extreme example. Suppose banks believe that with probability one k = 0:007 instead of k = 0:0042. Such a beliefs in fact is never confuted by observable produced at the risky SCE where no …rm will implement the safe technology. The case with k = 0:007 is displayed, with the same convention of …gure 1, in …gure 2. Notice that the risky SCE in …gure 1 is exactly the unique REE in …gure 2. In fact as long as safe project are not adopted in equilibrium, the two economies are observationally equivalent: not only at the risky equilibrium but also for any marginal deviation from that equilibrium. The two pictures only di¤er for non-marginal out-of-equilibrium deviations which could trigger, in the …rst case but not in the second, a change in the type of investment. 7 The aggregate investment is increasing in (and so decreasing in Rr) when the economy is on a risky equilibrium, whereas it is decreasing whenever 2 ( ; ) for which the safe equilibrium arises as a corner contract constrained by the …rms'pro…tability constraint. In the other regions where corner contract arises, namely when Rr = y and Rs = R CB , the economy displays no aggregate investment because, respectively …rms and banks, are indi¤erent to participating or not to the market. For values of < instead, when the equilibrium contract isRs the aggregate investment is insensitive to . 8 Concluding on the description of …gure 1, Panel D plots the probabilities q (R) (decreasing in R) and p (R) (increasing in R) at the SCE and the REE. Their evolution re ‡ect the e¤ects of directed search. For a given equilibrium, the higher (lower) the interest rate posted by a bank, the lower (higher) the probability of …lling that vacancy, and the higher (lower) the probability of …rms obtaining funds at that rate.
Policy interventions (preliminary)
The aim of this section is to provide a preliminary discussion of policy interventions. In the …rst subsection we build up a simple example to clarify that a SCE does not exclude that banks put a positive probability on a true state of the world. It just requires that they expect that deviations would generate losses which discourage individual deviation. We will argue that, in such a situation, there does not exist any incentive-compatible form of cooperation that banks could undertake to …ll their uncertainty.
The market and the problem of experimentation
Suppose for example, that, everything being the same, there exist two distinct states of the world characterized by two di¤erent values of k: low k l = 0:0042 which corresponds to the economy in …gure 1, and high k h = 0:007 whose case is depicted, everything being equal, in …gure 2. The best individual deviation from the risky SCE, namely o¤ering the safe REE contract, yields an expected net pro…t of about 2:5c in the …rst case, whereas, a loss of about c in the second one. Consider the case where at the beginning of time nature selected k l . The realization k l is known to banks unless they post contracts in the safe adoption region. Let we investigate which beliefs can sustain a risky SCE that is not a REE.
The lines in the left panel of …gure 5 display the expected payo¤ of a single bank, when all other bank post contratcts at the risky SCE, for three cases which di¤er for the beliefs of banks about k. This di¤erence shows up for interest rates lower than R the adoption frontier. The red dashed curve corresponds to the case when banks put zero probability on k l which mimics the case of …gure 2. The blu dashed curve denotes the case when banks put probability one on k l in analogy to …gure 1. Finally the solid blu is the one for which the expected pro…t from the best individual deviation in the safe territory equals the pro…t at the risky equilibrium. This curve obtains exactly when banks attach a probability 0:213 to k l . More pessimistic banks would sustain a risky SCE that is not REE. For more optimistic beliefs instead only a safe REE exists.
To sum up, the low-…x-cost economy is the actual state of the world but banks believe it with a probability < 0:213: then conforming to the SCE prescriptions is a dominant action from the point of view of a subjective Bayesian agent. Nevertheless the absence of observable counterfactuals in equilibrium prevents learning about the true state. In this sense a SCE does not require banks ignoring the presence of safe investment opportunities; it instead requires banks wrongly believe that with high probability is too costly for …rms implementing safe projects.
From the point of view of a bank, the evaluation of the bene…ts of a deviation concerns the expected return of one period only. In fact, independently from the outcome of the deviation, which is publicly observable, free entry will guarantee zero expected pro…ts on the best contract one period after. Free entry also deters cooperation among banks to experiment new markets since at the equilibrium banks have no resource to devote to subsidy eventual "explorers".
On the other hand, …rms do not have incentive to reveal the truth as long as debt contracts cannot depend on past actions (i.e. banks cannot punish or reward …rms for their past actions). More precisely, …rms always have incentive to signal that they will implement a safe project -irrespective of the state of the world -to obtain a lower interest rate and so higher pro…ts. Once the banks post a contract they cannot renegotiate the contract once the demand for funds has been realized. Unless banks do not cooperate to implement a collective punishment strategy -which however could well be not feasible 9 or simply too costly (again because of free entry) -…rms can exploit banks'con…dence.
Conventional Policy: lowering the cost of money
Let us …rstly consider the conventional policy of reduction of the cost of money. Figure 3 illustrates the e¤ect of lowering the CB interest rate from 0:01 to 0:005 in the economy described by …gure 1. A lower cost of money re ‡ects in lower interest rates on equilibrium contracts. In particular, such a policy can reduce the set of economies where a risky SCE exists. This happens when the optimal risky contract became bounded by the pro…tability constraint of …rms. In fact, in panel A and B, the dotted blue line exhibits a discontinuity in the range of for whichR r R. This is a case in which the best risky contract lies at the outside limit of the …rms'pro…tability frontier (i.e. posting a R 0 = R + " with " > 0 in…nitesimal), but posting a contract at the inside limit of the frontier (i.e. posting a R 0 = R " with " > 0 in…nitesimal) gives a higher payo¤. This is plotted in panel C. Therefore the set of risky SCE is reduced by a decrease of the CB interest rate. At the same time, the aggregate investment at the REE increases.
Nevertheless, the e¤ect of a decrease in the cost of money can be o¤set by a decrease in project return r. This scenario is illustrated by …gure 4. r is lowered from 0:03 to 0:02, all the rates shift downwards but now the frontier R also follows the move. The scenario is qualitatively the same as in …gure 1. Notice that in this particular example the risky REE arises as a corner equilibrium contract along the …rms'pro…tability frontier.
Credit-Easing through banks'subsidies
The revelation of …rms'true incentives through the opening of out-of-equilibrium credit markets breaks self-con…rming coordination failures, correcting wrong beliefs. The result can be achieved though a credit-easing policy, that is direct lending from the CB to the …rms. Nevertheless, it is realistic to assume that the central bank does not have lending facilities, so that it has to "use the market", that is, the policy should provide the right incentive for banks to maintain low interest rates. In particular we will explore the introduction of a subsidy s such that the payo¤ of banks which funds risky projects is (r; R; R CB ) = ( + sub) R R CB ;
whereas the payo¤ of a bank funding safe project (r; R; R CB ) is una¤ected.
The right panel of …gure 5 plots the expected payo¤ of a single bank, when all other bank post contracts at the risky SCE, in the case of a subsidy of sub = 0:1 for the same three cases and with the same conventions of the left panel. Notice that the subsidy has two contrasting e¤ects. On one hand, a subsidy reduces the loss in the k h scenario, so it increases the value of an individual deviation into the safe territory (that is, the red curve is higher). On the other hand, it reduces the distance between the equilibrium value of the risky interest rate -the risky option is less risky because of the subsidy -and the adoption frontier (the dashed blue curve decreases). This last e¤ect implies a lower competitive advantage for a single "deviator", meaning less …rms will apply to the out-of-equilibrium o¤er, and so value of an individual deviation lowers.
The net result of this trade-o¤ is depicted in …gure 6. The curve assigns for each value of the subsidy sub the minimal probability that banks put on k l that makes them to sustain a risky SCE. A partial subsidy has initially a positive e¤ect since it lowers the minimal belief that sustain a SCE. Nevertheless, as the subsidy approaches the totality of expected losses, in our calibration is 0:28 (as = 0:72), then the negative e¤ect prevails and the subsidy makes more di¢ cult to break a risky SCE. Nevertheess, at the limit of sub = 0:28 (and higher values) the banks are induced to post at (inside) the adoption frontier, for no matter which belief since the central bank is absorbing the whole risk. This way the authority can induce an experiment using the market.
Credit-Easing as a public good
The implementation of the policy does not require that the CB is more optimistic than private banks. The role of the policy maker is to act in the interest of the collectivity, banks and …rms, investing a fraction of current available resources to provide a public good: the experimentation of new markets. In other words, the aim of the policy is to produce a piece of information which has a extremely high social value but cannot be internalized by current private transactions.
In an intertemporal perspective the objective of the CB is to maximize the overall welfare
where is a discount factor weighting the welfare of future generations, J t and V t (R ) c denote the expected pro…t of respectively …rms and banks at the equilibrium. T is a tax introduced to cover the expected cost of the subsidy experiment that will hit …rms, since in equilibrium banks make zero pro…ts.
Following our previous example suppose that the CB believe, as banks, that the probability of the low-…x-cost economy (the one of …gure 1) is < 0:213. The resources for this incentive can be gathered through a taxation on actual …rms T t or through seigniorage. Imagine the experiment is conducted at time t. The expected social bene…t at time t is given by W t + W t (sub; ) where W t (sub; ) can be negative since the intervention distorts the equilibrium allocation. In particular, given the state of belief the optimal deviation R d for a single bank is such that either
Assuming that it takes one period for banks to update their beliefs, the expected welfare gain or loss relative to the period of experimentation is
Nevertheless although W t (sub; ) can be negative, the authority can well decide that the experiment is socially valuable as it can provide with useful information for the future generation of traders. In fact, the change in welfare of all subsequent periods
is a well de…ned positive value being equal to the expected increase in …rms' REE pro…ts (banks will earn zero due to free entry). Whether or not the gain in subsequent periods is a valuable social experimentation depends on the weights that future generations have in the preference of the policy maker. The social experiment is worth if and only if
that is the current expected cost is smaller than the discounted stream of higher welfare in the future. In particular, provided W t (sub; ) is bounded, there always exist a large enough such that the policy maker will make a social experiment as long as 6 = 0. A more conservative (progressist) policy maker, that is one with a lower (higher) , will be less (more) incline to social experimentation. In this sense the policy maker must act at the opposite of what predicted by a robust control criterion. With a ! 1 in fact the policy maker has incentive to experiment every good state of the world which receives a strictly positive probability.
Two remarks to conclude. First, notice that the intertemporal perspective is not strictly necessary as there could be also cases in which W t (sub; ) is a positive term. In such a case experimentation is worth for the current generation too. Finally, notice that by continuity, the argument works also with a policy maker that is more pessimist than the private sector. : Minimal pessimism for subsidy e¤ectiveness. The curve assigns for each value of the subsidy sub the minimal probability that banks put on k l that makes them to sustain a risky SCE. The parameters is the same as in …gure 5.
To derive (R; J ) we can use the de…nition of J in (14), so that
where
is a constant for any single deviation R. Hence, we obtain
, which is true at any state of the world. Hence (16) becomes
which is (18) in the main text. Notice that the result does not depend on which J is belived by banks.
If instead we consider two arbitrary single deviations R 1 and R 2 from R we get that the latter weakly dominates the former when
which becomes
after using (17). Finally we get
that is our operative criterion.
Therefore the best interior single deviation is the one that maximizes
whose …rst order condition is
at any state fo the world. Hence
which reconciles with the solution under certainty we found using standard techniques.
Proof of proposition 2 An interior SCE R is a solution to
where E [f (R; !)] = f (R; !) for any R 2 = (R ). 10 Therefore the following two FOCs
have to be satis…ed at the equilibrium R . Since p (R) = A (R) 1 and q (R) = A (R) we can rewrite the latter as 
After simple manipulations we have that, at the equilibrium,
which demonstrates that the Hosios condition is met.
Proof of proposition 3 Here we deal with REE that is the case where banks'beliefs are correct also out of equilibrium.
FIRST STEP. The …rst step of the proof is to eastablish the set of best R contracts conditional to …rms having incentives to adopt one speci…c type of technology. Call these locus best restriced contracts.
To obtain the best restriced contracts when no participation constraints bind it is enough to plug the explicit form of I and into (10). In the case of a risky technology we haveR
whereas in case of a safe technologŷ
(19) and (20) are the best interior contracts that a bank would provide if it was retricted to post a credit line respectively outside and inside the adoption frontier irrespective of any J value. This is intuitive since, as already noted, point ii) of de…nition of a SCE does not link J to the actual level granted in equilibrium J . Nevertheless, best interior contracts could be unfeasable due to participation constraint. To …nd the best restricted contracts when at least one participation constraint is binding for at least one type of agent, we make use of a simple convexity argument. In the abstract case where only one techonology is available, the maximization problem is nicely convex and has a single absolute maximum. Therefore, ceteris paribus, the closest the o¤ered contract toR r (resp.R s ), the higher the expected pro…ts V (R) of a bank. This implies that whenever for a level of it isR r > r then the best risky restricted-contract is r. Moreover, whenever for a level of it isR r < R then the best risky restricted-contract is R. Finally whenever for a level of it isR s > R then the best safe-restricted contract is R.
SECOND STEP. For best restriced-contracts to be REE, it is necessary (but still not su¢ cient) that in a neighborhood of the equilibrium other contracts does not yiled a strictly larger pro…t. For (19) and (20) this condition is always satis…ed as both emerge as solution of a well-de…ned maximization problem in R. So, both (19) and (20) are candidate for the next step.
Also in the case where the best risky-restricted contract is r, then a bank cannot do better locally as any local deviation from r will remains strictly outside the adoption frontier. Therefore also r is a candidate for the next step.
When instead best restricted contracts lie along the adoption frontier R the argument is more involved. First consider the case of a best risky-restricted contract along R. We need to use the criterion (18) to assess whether or not a single bank has incentive to deviate posting a contract inside the adoption frontier (i.e. posting a R " with " > 0 in…nitesimal) when all others post a contract outside the adotpion frontier (i.e. posting a R + " with " > 0 in…ni-tesimal): in the cases where this is true there do not exist REE risky contracts along R, otherwise we proceed to the third step.
A deviation from the risky equilibrium (all banks post R + ") into safe terriroty (the deviant posts R ") is worth if and only if, (s; R; R CB )I(s; R) (r; R; R CB )I(r; R) > (s; R; R CB )I(r; R) (r; R; R CB )I(s; R)
which is a rearrangement of (18). Hence, we have
and after substituting for R = r
For R R CB < 0 banks do not have incentive to enter in the market for risky credit so that a risky REE does not exist in this case. When instead R R CB 0 then the inequality always holds for whatever < 1. Therefore we can conclude that a risky REE does not exist along the R frontier.
Let us turn attention to the case of a best safe-restricted contract along R. We apply the criterion (21) along R = r k 1 > R CB to assess whether a single bank has incentive to post a contract outside the adoption frontier (i.e. posting a R + " with " > 0 in…nitesimal) when all others post a contract inside the adoption frontier (i.e. posting a R " with " > 0 in…nitesimal); in the cases where this is true there do not exist REE safe contracts along R, otherwise we proceed to the third step. Applying (21) we have a relation which holds as a strict inequality whenever (22) is false. Therefore we can conclude that there could exist safe REE in the caseR s > R along the R frontier. THIRD STEP. This is the …nal step. Once selected the best restricted contracts (step 1) that are local maxima (step 2), we need to establish whether they are global maxima, that is, if they are REE. Now we apply (18) to the di¤erent cases, distinguishing between interior and corner contracts.
The relevant equation for an interior best restricted contract to be a REE when both type of interior best restricted contracts (R s =R s and R r =R r ) are feaseable is which holds is and only if r k=(1 ) > 0. Since a necessary condition for the existence of an interior best safe-restricted contract is that the adoption region is not empty, R > R CB , this condition always holds: whenever an interior best safe-restricted contract exists then it is a REE. When instead we confront an interior best safe-restricted contract with a corner best risky-restricted contract posted at r, then the right-hand side of the disequality takes value zero so that the disequality is trivially satis…ed. We conclude that whenever an interior best safe-restricted contract exists then it is a REE.
When instead the best safe-restricted contract is posted at R CB , that is when > r k R CB r R CB , whereas the best risky-restricted contract is an interior (r R CB > 0), we have 0 > (1 ) (1 + )
which is always true. This implies that whenever an interior best risky-restricted contract co-exists with a corner best safe-restricted contract being posted at R CB , the former is always the unique REE.
When instead the best safe-restricted contract is is posted at R 6 = R CB , whereas the best safe-restricted contract is an interior, we have de…nes a threshold^ , such that for <^ the corner best safe-restricted contract is the unique REE, whereas for >^ the interior best risky-restricted contract is the unique a REE. The zero measure case =^ is the only one where two non-degenerate REE exist. In particular, notice that since is true whenever (1 )(1 + )(r k R CB ) 2k < 0. This implies that^ has to be decreasing in k.
When instead the best safe-restricted contract is posted at R 6 = R CB , whereas the best safe-restricted contract is posted at r (r R CB < 0), we have
so that^ = . This implies that whenever a corner best risky-restricted contract co-exists with a corner best safe-restricted contract being posted at R > R CB , the latter is always the unique REE.
Finally whenever a corner best risky-restricted contract being posted at r (which requires R CB =r ) co-exists with a corner best safe-restricted contract being posted at R CB (which requires r k=(1 ) R CB ), the two arise as two degenerate REE.
